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FROM ACT PSYCHOLOGY TO
PROBABILISTIC
FUNCTIONALISM: THE PLACE OF
EGON BRUNSWIK IN THE
HISTORY OF PSYCHOLOGY*
DAVIDE. LEARY

In the coming years, Egon Brunswik will hold an ever increasingly
significant and important position in the history of psychology.
(from Edward C. Tolman's eulogy, 1956)
Despite Tolman's prediction, Egon Brunswik's place in the history of psychology has yet to be firmly established. Although his name and his concepts are frequently invoked, they are rarely used in defense of positions
that he would have recognized as his own. And although most contemporary psychologists have failed to comprehend either the details or the
underlying rationale of his psychological theory, historians of psychology
have done even less to clarify the context, development, and import of
his life and work.'
This neglect is unfortunate. Brunswik deserves much greater attention,
not only because he was one of the major twentieth-century theorists on
the psychology of perception, or because he was unusually prescient
about later developments in psychology, but because his life and work
constitute an extremely useful case history for the study of a variety of
*This chapter is based on a much larger study of Egon Brunswik's life and work, which was
partially supported by grants from the History of Psychology Foundation and the National
Science Foundation. Different versions have been presented to the American Psychological Association, the Department of Psychology at the University of California at Berkeley,
and Cheiron: The International Society for the History of the Behavioral and Social Sciences. I thank Kenneth R. Hammond for the invitation that m1tiated this research project;
Marion White McPherson, John Popplestone, and John Miller of the Archives of the History of American Psychology, Akron, Oh10, for their help in locatmg materials relevant to
this project; and the many former colleagues and students ofBrunswik who shared letters,
lecture notes, and memories of Brunswik. I also thank David Devonis for his assistance
in drafting the two diagrams used in this chapter. I dedicate this essay to Leonard Kneger,
in gratitude for his guidance of my first attempts to understand the German-language psychology of the past.
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critical historical issues, including topics of interest to both intellectual
and social historians.
My primary concern in this chapter will be the conceptual and methodological development of Brunswik's psychology over the course of his
career and in the context of his migration from Vienna to Berkeley. Without discussing the individual doctrines of his psychological system in
extensive detail, I will describe its basic foundations and the historical
sequence by which it was constructed. In doing so, I will show how Brunswik's psychology was based on a very unusual blending of intellectual
and scientific traditions.
In addition to reviewing the foundations and historical development
of Brunswik's psychology, I will also review its historical impact and consider why it has not been more influential. In the course of this analysis
I will discuss some factors intrinsic to his psychology, the significance of
his migration from Europe to the United States, and the means by which
he tried to disseminate his ideas. Together with the preceding analysis of
his psychology, these considerations should help us understand why
Brunswik's legacy remains undefined over thirty years after Tolman's
eulogistic prediction.
AN OVERVIEW OF BRUNSWIK'S CAREER

Egon Brunswik was born in Budapest on March 18, 1903. From the age
of eight he was educated in the best schools in Vienna. Then, in 1923,
after two years as an engineering student, he transferred to the University
of Vienna where he began to study psychology under Karl Buhler. At the
time Buhler was one of the foremost psychologists in the world. In the
exciting atmosphere of Buhler's Psychological Institute, Brunswik was
immediately swept into his newfound discipline and became an active
participant in Btihler's famous Wednesday evening discussion group.
As if this were not stimulation enough, Brunswik was soon a frequent
participant in a Thursday evening discussion group held by Professor
Moritz Schlick. During the years of Brunswik's participation this group
was the seedbed from which the Vienna Circle of logical positivists
emerged, and for the rest of his career Brunswik maintained personal,
professional, and intellectual ties with the logical positivists and with the
Unity of Science Movement that grew out of logical positivism. So from
the very beginning of his career, we can see the formation of distinctive
philosophical as well as psychological interests. The integration of these
interests became an implicit goal of Brunswik's lifework.
Brunswik received his PhD in psychology in 1927, and he immediately
became an assistant in Btihler's Institute. For the next seven years, with
the exception of a year spent teaching in Ankara, Turkey, Brunswik
directed research at the Psychological Institute and continued his own
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research in the area of perception. In 1934 he published a major book,
Wahrnehmung und Gegenstandswelt, which was based on his research of
the preceding seven years. At the same time he became an associate professor, and soon thereafter he was invited by Edward C. Tolman to spend
the 1935-36 academic year as a visiting lecturer and research fellow at
the University of California, Berkeley. This mvitation came as the result
of a sabbatical that Tolman spent in Vienna m 1933-34. During this sabbatical he and Brunswik discovered that their psychological ideas were
quite compatible and even complementary- so much so that the 47-yearold Tolman and 30-year-old Brunswik had co-authored an important theoretical article entitled "The Organism and the Causal Texture of the
Environment." 2
Brunswik's one-year stay in Berkeley was apparently mutually satisfactory, for in 1937, after an intervening year in Vienna, Brunswik returned
to Berkeley as an assistant professor. He remained at Berkeley, advancing
through the academic ranks, until his untimely death in 1955. Thus his
career at Berkeley coincided almost exactly with the classical period in
that department's history. During this time Brunswik was widely
acknowledged to be, in essence, the department's intellectual conscience.
His deep scholarship and meticulous research provided an exacting
model of intellectual and methodological integrity for several generations
of students and faculty.

THE FOURFOLD BASIS OF BRUNSWIK'S PSYCHOLOGY

This brief chronology has alluded to three primary bases of Brunswik's
psychology, namely, the European functionalist tradition, represented by
Buhler; the logical positivist movement, generated by and around
Schlick; and American neo-behaviorism, as set forth by Tolman. The second and third of these bases - the positivist and behavionst traditions served to modify and extend the first. In turn, the psychology constructed
on all three of these bases was extended and modified during Brunswik's
years in the United States by a fourth and final tradition - the AngloAmerican statistical tradition. As embodied in a succession of research
assistants, such as Rheem Jarrett and Robert Rollin, this tradition helped
Brunswik articulate a more sophisticated methodology for his emerging
psychological system. With the elaboration of this methodology, Brunswik's psychology reached its mature form in the decade before his death.
The most important factor in the development of Brunswik's psychology was clearly the first of the four traditions I have pomted out - the
European functionalist tradition as advanced by Karl Buhler and
amended, as we will see, under the influence of Fritz Heider.
The ancestry of Biihler's psychology extended back through Oswald
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Kiilpe, his mentor at Wilrzburg, to Franz Brentano, the founder of socalled act psychology. The fundamental postulate of Brentano's psychology is well known, even if the scope of its impact is not. The basic fact
about psychological activities, according to Brentano, is that they always
include a reference to some object. Consciousness, to take the most general case, is always consciousness of something. The practical result of
this basic postulate was the dissolution of the philosophically worrisome
dualism of subject and object, or knower and known. Killpe, Bi.ihler and
others accepted this postulate as a basic statement of a functional, or relational, theory of mind. 3
Btihler's contribution consisted in pointing out and providing experimental corroboration of the fact that the fundamental unity of subject
and object is not so definitive that each and every aspect of the objectworld is related to one and only one psychic experience. Quite the contrary, in his groundbreaking studies in Gestalt psychology, he showed
that the relationship between particular aspects of the object-world (sensations) and the experiential awareness of the subject (perception) is fundamentally ambiguous. Any given sensory stimulus, he showed, will be
perceived differently when placed against a different contextual background.4 Furthermore, Buhler found that the same principle could be
applied in the study of language: no word has a single fixed meaning;
rather, all words receive their meaning from the sentence and paragraph
in which they are embedded. Any given word can mean several or more
things, depending on the context in which it is uttered. Thus, the hearer
of language must interpret - must infer the probable meaning of a word
- based on the word's relation to its linguistic setting. This interpretation
by the hearer is, of course, usually unconscious.
Over several decades, based on such research, Buhler formulated his
well-known principle of "representation" - a principle he applied to all
psychological phenomena, but most explicitly to language. Words, Buhler
maintained, represent things or thoughts; they are not the things or
thoughts themselves. Just as words can have different meanings and thus
represent different objects, so too can objects be represented by different
words. There is, in other words, no invariant one-to-one relationship
between representations or signs (whether these be perceptual cues or
words) and the things they represent. 5
This was the state of affairs when Brunswik became Biihler's student
in 1923. He soon began to follow up on Buhler's previous work on perception, and in particular on perceptual constancy. The influence of
Buhler on Brunswik was profound and lasting. Between 1927 and 1929
Brunswik confirmed and extended Biihler's previous research, showing
that perception is not a simple function of sensation, that there are fundamental ambiguities in stimulus information, and that the perceiver can
and usually does learn to resolve most of these ambiguities in a fairly
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stable and reliable fashion. As a basic premise in all this work, Brunswik
accepted Bi.ihler's notion of perception as a subject-object relationship. 6
Then, in 1929, Brunswik read Fritz Heider's paper on "Ding und
Medium," and his thinking took a significant step forward. Heider, as a
student of Alexi us Meinong, was a member of the same functionalist tradition extending back to Brentano. 7 Not surprisingly, his article corroborated the relational framework Brunswik had inherited from Bi.ihler.
However, it also directed Brunswik's attention more forcefully toward
the object side of the subject-object continuum. It did so by pointing out
that most objects are not in immediate contact with the subject; rather,
they are separated from the subject by a "medium" through which perception has to be achieved. The real issue for the psychology of perception, Brunswik came to see, was how the subject could use "proximal"
(immediate) sensory cues to infer the nature of the "distal" (distant)
objects that these cues represent. From this point on, Brunswik referred
to his psychology as a "psychology in terms of the object." By this he
meant that it was the task of psychology to determine how and to what
degree individuals establish veridical contact with the world of objects.
In his subsequent work, Brunswik understood proximal sensations (stimuli impinging directly on the sense organs) as representations of certain
aspects of the distal object world, and he sought to discover how it is that
perceivers achieve perceptions of objects on the basis of these representative sensory cues. 8
At this point in the development of his psychological system, Brunswik's affiliation with the logical positivist group had a significant impact
on his work. The impact was somewhat paradoxical. To date he had
accepted the general conceptual framework of the European functionalist
tradition and had begun to articulate his own distinctive version of functionalist theory, but he had not yet been converted to the probabilist
assumptions that were to characterize his mature psychology. He came
to accept these assumptions - and here is the paradox - through his allegiance to the logical positivist movement, and, specifically, as a result of
a grave challenge posed by this movement to his Btihlerian heritage.
To understand this, we must recall that one of the major doctrines of
the Vienna Circle was a theory of meaning and truth that was based on
the contention that scientific language should and could be reducible to
invariant sense-data referents. 9 Each term of scientific discourse, they
claimed, must have one and only one sense datum (or set of sense data)
as a referent. The problem...was that Brunswik had corroborated Bi.ihler's
finding that the relationship between sense data and their objects - or
between words and their referents - is fundamentally ambiguous, that is,
uncertain. Not surprisingly, this contradiction between the epistemological premises of the Vienna Circle and the empirical results of his own
experiments created an intellectual crisis for Brunswik, who was equally
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attracted to both of the ventures - philosophical and psychological - in
which he was a privileged participant.
Brunswik resolved this tension through the discovery of the work of
Hans Reichenbach, the leader of the Berlin school of logical positivists,
who proposed a probabilistic theory of human knowledge in opposition
to the Vienna Circle's stipulative and nomothetic approach. 10 This theory
allowed Brunswik to resolve the fundamental conflict between his psychological.findings and his desire to achieve a philosophically sound psychological theory. Utilizing Reichenbach's argument that all human
knowledge is probabilistic, Brunswik was able to rationalize the ambiguous relationship between sensory cues and their objective referents by
speaking of this relationship as probabilistic in nature. In principle, he
was able to argue, objects can be perceived and therefore known only
probabilistically. There is no one-to-one relationship between sense data
and the objective world, nor can there be a one-to-one relationship
between sense data and language, as the Vienna Circle claimed at that
time.
Because Reichenbach was so widely respected among members of the
Vienna Circle, Brunswik was thus able to maintain his allegiance to the
general logical positivist movement while also remaining true to the
premises and results of his psychological research. At the same time, the
self-conscious designation of functional relations as probabilistic in principle - and not simply in relation to our imperfect means of knowing
about such relations - constituted a major step towards his eventual system of "probabilistic functionalism."
The next state in the development of Brunswik's psychology occurred
under the influence of the American behaviorist Edward C. Tolman, who
corroborated the logical positivist insistence on objectivistic methodology, and particularly on verifiable, physicalistic measurements. This
insistence led Brunswik - ironically, in view of Tolman's own use of
"intervening variables" - to begin thinking in terms of a "psychology
without an organism." As a result, the subjective pole in the functional
relationship between the subject and object receded from Brunswik's psychology for more than a decade. 11
Tolman also stimulated Brunswik to broaden his psychological system
to include behavioral as well as perceptual events. In this regard Brunswik had an equally important reciprocal influence on Tolman, who
simultaneously expanded the scope of his psychological metatheory to
treat sensation and perception more specifically than before. These
mutual influences were first explicated in their classic article on "The
Organism and the Causal Texture of the Environment."
At the beginning of this article Tolman and Brunswik noted that they
had composed their joint publication because they discovered that "our
previous separate investigations had led us quite independently of one
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another to a common point of view as to the general nature of psychology." Indeed, the parallels in their "common point of view" were remarkable. These resulted, they said, from a shared vision of psychology as
"primarily concerned with the methods of response of the organism to
two characteristic features of the environment" - first, that the environment is a "causal texture" in which different events are regularly (but not
invariably) linked with one another and, second, that these "causal couplings," because they are not absolutely invariant, are in any given
instance "to some degree equivocal" or uncertain. The first characteristic,
the regular linkages between different environmental events, had led each
of them to the conclusion that certain events can serve as "signs" (Tolman) or "cues" (Brunswik) or "local representatives" (Tolman and Brunswik) from which other events or entities or goal states could be inferred
and responded to, either behaviorally or perceptually. The second characteristic, that "local representatives" are "not connected in simply oneone univocal ... fashion" with these represented events, entities, and
goal states, had led them to emphasize the significance of the "differing
frequencies" - the relative probabilities - that characterize these relations
and, therefore, characterize the "attainment" of behavioral "ends" (Tolman) and of perceptual "objects" (Brunswik). 12
In other words, Tolman and Brunswik had independently arrived at
the conviction that organisms operate on the basis of "hypotheses" that
have "only a certain probability of being valid." Whether it is a rat trying
to reach the food chamber ofa T-maze (Tolman) or a human being trying
to estimate the actual size of a distant object (Brunswik), the organism
acts to achieve its distant goals by means of the immediate "signs" or
"cues" at its disposal, and it continually adjusts its assumptions about
the referents of these "local representives" on the basis of ongoing experience. The organism's task, Tolman and Brunswik said, "is to correct
whatever hypotheses it brings with it to fit the real probabilities of the
actually presented setup." 13
At this point two diagrams will help clarify and summarize the basic
structure of Brunswik's perceptual theory and the expanded metapsychology that he produced together with Tolman. Under the impact of
Reider's notion of mediated perception, Brunswik had developed what
he called a "lens model" of perception (see Figure 5-1). The illustration
of this model crystallizes the core of Brunswik's perceptual theory. 14
According to Brunswik's lens model, the distal object occasions various
proximal sensations in the peripheral senses of the organism. These
peripheral senses serve as a "lens" that collects the various cues and
directs them to a central "focal point" where they are selectively utilized
by the organism in the production of a "central response." In the typical
Brunswikian experiment, this response was a visual perception of an
object's size, objectively measured by the subject's verbal estimate of the
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Figure 5-1. Bunswik's lens model of perception.

object's actual size. The degree of veridical accuracy of a given perception
was, for Brunswik, the measure of its achievement, or what he later called
its "functional validity."
The organism's perceptual achievements, according to Brunswik,
depend on the selective use of an array of cues. In the course of experience, the organism learns that some cues are more likely than others to
represent a given dimension of the external world. As a result, the organism places greater trust in these cues. (In Brunswik's later terminology, it
comes to realize that these cues have greater "ecological validity," and it
therefore gives them preeminence in its "hierarchy of cues.") However,
since the relation between the organism and its environment is never
completely static, the organism's expectations about the validity of cues
are never absolutely certain and are continually subject to revision.
An expanded lens model can be used to represent the broadening of
Brunswik's psychology that took place in collaboration with Tolman (see
Figure 5-2). The extended portion of this model is a symmetrical, mirror
image of the earlier model. On the new "motor" side of the diagram, an
array of habits - alternate behaviors leading to any given goal - take the
place of the hierarchy of cues on the sensory side of the model. Each
potential behavior - each of the means at the organism's disposal - has
a differential probability ofleading to the intended goal. As in perception,
the organism's behavioral responses are guided by hypotheses regarding
the probable success of each of these alternative means. And again, the
achievement of the organism's ends - for instance, the reaching of a food
chamber in a T-maze - can be objectively measured. For the phenomena

Egon Brunswik and the history of psychology

123

i)stal
ob/ecf

Cenfra/

response

Figure 5-2. Extension of the lens model to behavior.

represented by this side of the diagram, Tolman's research on purposive
behavior served as the prototypic illustration. 15
Although their own investigations up to the mid-l 930s had focused on
a more restricted set of topics, Brunswik and Tolman concluded their
classic article with the suggestion that
all the problems of psychology - not only those of visual perception and oflearning - but all the more general problems of instinct,
insight, learning, intelligence, motivation, personality, and emotion
all center around this one general feature of the given organism's
abilities and tendencies for adjusting to these actual causal textures
- these actual probabilities as to causal couplings. 16

Thus, by the time he came to the United States in 1935, Brunswik had
developed a distinctive theory of perception and had extended that theory, in collaboration with Tolman, to cover - at least in principle - the
entire domain of psychology. But a theory, however comprehensive in
scope, is one thing; a fully articulated psychology with an appropriate
methodology and an adequate stock of data is something else. Up to this
point Brunswik's research had concentrated almost exclusively on
selected topics in the psychology of perception, and in this research he
had utilized relatively unsophisticated modes of quantitative analysis.
For instance, he used simple ratios, comparing estimated to actual object
size, as a gauge of the accuracy of perception. This was an effective way
to describe the phenomena of size constancy, which was the. typical ex per-
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imental problem that he and his students studied, but in the United
States Brunswik was soon exposed to much more powerful ways of interpreting his data. In good part through his interaction with a series of graduate assistants, Brunswik came to realize that his psychological theory
could be expressed and tested much more persuasively through the language and use of correlation statistics.
Although the addition of statistical means of analysis may seem a trivial amendment of Brunswik's psychology, it was actually quite significant, for in matching his theoretical commitment to probabilism with a
methodological commitment to probability-based analytical techniques,
Brunswik completed the interlacing of a conceptual and methodological
foundation on which he was now prepared to erect his mature system of
probabilistic functionalism.
BRUNSWIK'S PROBABILISTIC FUNCTIONALISM

During his one-year stay in Berkeley in 1935-36, prior to his permanent
move to the United States in 1937, Brunswik started to redeem his claim
that behavioral as well as perceptual phenomena are probabilistic in
nature. In a study of "Probability as a Determiner of Rat Behavior,"
Brunswik investigated behavioral-response learning in the context of
varying probabilities of reward (or "goal achievement"), a context which
as he said was more representative of "the natural environment of a living being" than the all-or-none reward schedules used in previous behavioral studies. When it was published in 1939, this study was noteworthy
for its use of partial reinforcement and for being the first publication in
which Brunswik applied correlation statistics. 17
From this point on, Brunswik's distinctive approach to the study and
understanding of psychological phenomena - and his realization of its
far-reaching implications - unfolded at a rapid pace. Returning to the
area of perception, he extended his use of correlation statistics in "Thing
Constancy as Measured by Correlation Coefficients," published in 1940.
This study advanced Brunswik's investigation of size constancy, demonstrating through a complex set of correlations that perceivers utilize
sensory cues of relatively low degrees of reliability- having nowhere near
one-to-one correspondence to reality- in the process of attaining remarkably high degrees of veridical perception (or "object achievement"). In
other words, this study showed that the overarching functional relation
between subject and object - the correlation between "central responses"
and "distal objects" - was much greater than the correlation between
"mediating proximal cues" and "distal objects." The clear implication
was that perceivers make inferences about the object-world that go
beyond the information provided by cues apparently on the basis of past
experience with similarly ambiguous cues and distant objects. 18
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As important as this study was, it still relied on traditional experimental procedures. However, even before this study was in print, Brunswik
realized that his psychological premises demanded a much more radical
departure from traditional modes of investigation, and he set about
designing a study of perceptual size constancy that would take place in a
natural environment rather than a laboratory. Furthermore, instead of
randomly varying subjects in this study, as was and still remains the standard procedure in experimental psychology, Brunswik opted to investigate the perceptions of only one individual across a variety of real-life
situations, allowing the objects to be perceived to be randomly selected
according to their chance occurrence in the subject's perceptual field at
any given time. 19
Clearly this was a radically new way of doing psychological research,
and not surprisingly it aroused attention and debate among psychologists.
In fact, as a result of a major address by Brunswik at the Sixth International Congress for the Unity of Science in 1941, the debate was under
way long before he published his monograph-length report on this project
in 1944. The original antagonists in this debate were Clark Hull and Kurt
Lewin, Brunswik's distinguished co-symposiasts at the Congress. Their
critical comments, published in 1943 along with Brunswik's address,
started a controversy that continued throughout the final decade of Brunswik's life. 20
We are already familiar with the fundamental notions underlying the
position Brunswik advocated in his address, which he titled "Organismic
Achievement and Environmental Probability." As we have seen, these
notions were rooted deeply in Brunswik's intellectual history, but he
expressed them now more forcefully than ever before. As in his classic
article with Tolman, Brunswik emphasized that organismic achievement
involves either the perception of distal objects or the attaining of behavioral goals, that the cues and means that facilitate perceptual and behavioral achievements are always "ambiguous," and that therefore the
achievement of veridical perception and of behavioral goals is always to
a certain degree probabilistic. Furthermore, Brunswik argued that such
achievements are the result of the organism's "focusing" on distal objects
and goals, albeit through the media of cues and means. This focusing of
the organism on the ends of psychological processes - on distal objects
and goals rather than on proximal cues and means - warrants, Brunswik
said, a "molar" approach to psychological investigation. In other words,
the primary concern of a functionalist psychology should be the correlation of the organism's perceptions and behaviors with their targeted
objects and objectives, not the designation of less probable and replaceable "molecular" events.
To this molar functionalism Brunswik now added a thoroughgoing statistical probabilism. Psychology, he said,
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as long as it wishes to deal with the vitally relevant molar aspects of
adjustment and achievement, has to become statistical throughout,
instead of being statistical where it seems hopeless to be otherwise,
and cherishing the nomothetic ideals of traditional experimental
psychology as far as relationships between geographic stimulus variables and response variables are concerned. 21
This was the challenge to which Brunswik's critics responded most vociferously. They realized that granting Brunswik's contentions would necessitate "the extension of such an instrument as correlation statistics from
individual differences to stimulus-response relationships," the "representative sampling" of both perceptual objects and behavioral objectives,
and the acceptance of statistical generalizations as the ultimate type of
regularity that can be discovered by psychology. 22 For if the objects of
perception and the objectives of behavior are the proper concerns of a
functionalist or molar psychology, and if these objects and goals vary as
much as - or even more than - the organisms that achieve them, then it
is as important to sample the population of relevant natural objects and
goals as it is to sample the population ofrelevant organisms - and for one
and the same reason, so that individual differences among objects and
goals can be taken into consideration, just as individual differences
among organisms must be taken into consideration, in a properly statistical, which is to say, a thoroughly probabilistic analysis. Only then can
psychologists make the kind of generalizations - statistical generalizations - that are worthy of a truly functionalist psychology.
The critical response to these contentions illustrated both the misunderstanding and the resistance that were to plague Brunswik in his
remaining years. Clark Hull's critique can serve as an exemplar. After
setting up a contrast between probability and natural law, he argued that
"scientific theory is concerned with natural laws. These are conceived as
being uniform. Do such isolable uniformities exist in the field of behavior? . . . Lewin and I believe they do; Brunswik, on the other hand, is
convinced that no such uniformities exist." 23 The confirmation of one or
the other of these beliefs, Hull said, must await "prolonged effort directed
specifically to this task" of discovering uniform natural laws. Brunswik,
he implied, had given up the quest as hopeless before he had devoted
adequate effort to the "laborious and time-consuming" task at hand. In
any case, even an ideal science like physics must accept certain errors of
measurement that are bound to occur because "it is impossible to know
the exact conditions" surrounding a given phenomenon. As a result, even
in physics empirical correlations among phenomena are bound to be less
than 1.00. It should not be surprising, then, if correlations in psychology
are less than perfect. Even more than in physics "we always lack absolutely exact knowledge concerning [the] conditions" surrounding psycho-
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logical phenomena. But this does not mean that psychologists are
doomed to live with probability rather than natural law, any more than
it means that physicists are. 24
Hull's response showed how much he "cherished the nomothetic ideals
of traditional experimental psychology," as Brunswik had put it. It also
showed a fundamental confusion that Brunswik had to suffer for the rest
of his life. Brunswik was not concerned that "we" who observe someone
else's behavior cannot make precise predictions because "we" lack complete information about the organism's environmental conditions; rather,
as he put it in a later publication, Brunswik was convinced that "so long
as the organism does not develop, or fails in a given context to utilize
completely, the powers of a fullfledged physicist observer and analyst, his
environment remains for all practical purposes a semierratic medium [for
him]; it is no more than partially controlled and no more than probabilistically predictable" from the point of view of the organism; and it is the
organism that must respond on the basis of its own, necessarily probabilistic knowledge. 25
To give Hull his due, this rejoinder relies on an aspect of Brunswik's
thought that had been de-emphasized - even suppressed - since 1934,
when he had chosen to develop a "psychology without an organism." I
am referring to the cognitive role of the subject in the subject-object relationship that formed the basic foundation of his approach. Under the
influence of the logical positivist and behavioral movements, Brunswik
had rejected the use of "intervening variables" and the study of mediational processes as a valid concern for a "psychology in terms of the
object." But it is not easy to shuck basic aspects of a system of thought,
and the later elaboration of his system demanded the resurrection of its
"missing dimension."
Interestingly, Hull sensed the inconsistency of Brunswik's critique of
intervening variables, or as Hull called them, "symbolic constructs," and
he noted that Brunswik himself seemed "at certain moments at least to
introduce perception as a variable intervening between the physical stimulation of his subjects and their verbal responses. " 26 A glance at the lens
model diagrams that portray the basic structure ofBrunswik's theory (see
Figures 5-1 and 5-2) confirms what Hull said. Even ifBrunswik preferred
to focus on organismic achievements, he had to admit that the achievements depended on some sort of mediational processes that he had represented, however schematically, in this model. In his desire to remain
as objectivistic as possible, however, he had renounced further discussion
of these processes. But his whole point about the organism actively calculating its own behavior, actively responding according to its own perceptual and behavioral expectations - its "hypotheses" about the objects,
events, and possibilities in its environment - implicated a ·recognition of
the organism as a cognizing subject.
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Whether in response to Hull's point or not, Brunswik began in the early
1940s to reinsert into his research a distinction he used years before in
Vienna, a distinction between "perception" and "thinking," or more specifically, between the kind of cognition that occurs when a subject is in a
relaxed, uncritical mental attitude and the kind of cognition that occurs
when a subject is in a "betting" or calculating mental attitude. He also
began to think of the organism as "an intuitive statistician" that routinely
makes probabilistic inferences about its surrounding environment without being self-conscious about it, and he became one of the first psychologists to note the relevance of cybernetics and communications theory
for psychology, well before the wholesale revival of cognitivism in
psychology. 27
Still, Brunswik was clearly uncomfortable speculating about organismic processes, and it was not until he could offer a "statistical separation of perception, thinking, and attitude" in 1946 that he became more
comfortable with this aspect of his metatheory. 28 Although his "statistical
separation" was not adopted by other researchers, he continued to elaborate his "ratiomorphic models of perception," for which he was subsequently designated a forerunner of the cognitive movement in psychology. Fittingly, one of the last pieces that he completed before his death
was a posthumously published paper on the "Scope and Aspects of the
Cognitive Problem." True to his original functionalist insight, he concluded this paper by saying that "only by detailed analysis of ecological
[i.e., environmental] textures can the cognitive problem be restored from
mere utilization problems [regarding how organisms use cues and means]
to its full scope of achievement problems and thus again become the key
to the core problem of psychology, that of the adjustment of the organism
to a complex environment." 29 For Brunswik the cognitive problem, like
all other psychological problems, had to be approached within the context of the primary relationship between subject and object - between the
organism and its environment.
Whether or not Hull's critique sparked Brunswik's reassertion of the
organism's role in psychological dynamics, it did provide an incentive for
a longer, more formal statement about probabilistic functionalism. Brunswik made that statement in 194 7 in a monograph entitled Systematic
and Representative Design of Psychological Experiments. 30 This treatise,
one of the most remarkable works in twentieth-century psychology, is
properly considered Brunswik's major manifesto. However, it is remembered primarily for its critique of traditional psychology and for various
of its concepts that have been borrowed and used in other contexts. It has
rarely been used as Brunswik intended - as a blueprint for a methodological revolution in psychology.
The central distinction that Brunswik drew in this work was between
the "systematic" and "representative" design of psychological experi-
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ments. In the systematic experiments typical of experimental psychology,
Brunswik said, the organisms that serve as the subjects of investigation
are sampled because their idiosyncratic characteristics cannot be separated and controlled, and their responses are then treated statistically so
that generalizations can be made to other organisms that did not participate in the experiment. However, the environmental stimulus variables
used in systematic experiments are typically separated and controlled to
keep them constant or independent of one another, irrespective of how
they covary, probabilistically, in the natural environment of the organism
under investigation. As a result, many of these variables are artificially
"tied" during the course of the experiment, and this "unnatural covariation of independent variables" destroys the grounds for logical inferences about the generalizability of experimental results. Consequently, it
should not be surprising that generalizations from systematic experiments tend to break down across a variety of natural environments, just
as they would for other organisms if the subject population had not been
adequately sampled. In representative design, on the other hand, stimulus conditions would not be "unnaturally covaried," but would be sampled representatively just as subjects are in traditional experiments. Then
the same logic of induction and the same statistical procedures could be
performed on situational variables as are now performed on responses,
and a thoroughgoing probabilism would establish psychology as a science
of properly general results.
Rightly or not, Brunswik's arguments did not stimulate sustained
attention, much less the conversion of large numbers of psychologists. In
the absence of such success, Brunswik tried a different mode of publication. After many years of work, he completed and published his longoverdue historical treatise on The Conceptual Framework of Psychology
in 1952. 31 This brilliant, if eccentric, work shows that Brunswik was not
only a psychologist and philosopher of science; he was also a preeminent
historian of psychology. Though his historical account is what we might
call "presentistic" in that it leads inevitably up to his own probabilistic
functionalism, his historical analyses are both profound and provocative,
and they convey the rich historical context in which Brunswik situated
his own work. Still, although it contributed to his reputation, Brunswik's
monograph did not convert many psychologists to his point of view.
In July 1953, at the Berkeley Conference for the Unity of Science,
Brunswik made his last major attempt to explain and defend probabilistic
functionalism. Subsequently published in May 1955, Brunswik's exposition and reply to his critics - specifically to Herbert Feig!, Ernest R. Hilgard, David Krech, and Leo Postman - was literally his last stand. 32 Two
months after its appearance, he committed suicide. Alth<:rngh ill health
and several other factors were important incentives, there is little doubt
that his final act was the tragic consequence of his deep depression over
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his inability to convince his contemporaries that what he had to say was
of fundamental importance.
BRUNSWICK'S LEGACY

No major psychologist fails to have some effect on the course of psychology, and by any account Egon Brunswik was a major psychologist.
Still, the situation at the time of his death was pathetic. Kenneth Hammond, a former student of Brunswik recalled that
During the spring of 1954 [a year before Brunswik's death], I visited
Brunswik in his office at Berkeley.... During the visit, Brunswik
opened a file drawer and showed me two folders - one labeled Hammond, the other, Smedslund - and with unmistakable pride indicated that there were now two psychologists who were doing Brunswikian research .... Apparently there was no one else. 33
But Hammond persevered, and over the years the number oflegitimately
called Brunswikians has grown. It is still a relatively small body of
researchers, but they form an active and dedicated group with remarkably
diverse interests, covering the entire range of topics falling between the
end-terms in Brunswik's double-lens model (see Figure 5-2). According
to Hammond's count,
Over 200 studies have been carried out within the Brunswikian
framework since 1964 [up to 1980]. They include numerous studies
of clinical judgment; multiple-cue probability learning, which produced the concepts of cognitive feedback in contrast to conventional outcome feedback, as well as cognitive control, and cognitive
skill; studies of interpersonal learning and interpersonal conflict; the
effects of psychotherapeutic drugs on all of these processes; interactive judgment analysis that provides immediate cognitive feedback regarding judgments, and thus makes it possible to apply the
Brunswikian tradition to the study of policy formation, policy
implementation, and the study of expert judgment, as well as animal behavior. 34
It is symptomatic that Hammond's count of Brunswikian research
begins in 1964, almost a decade after Brunswik's death. Before and even
after that time, most of the influence that might be accorded to Brunswik
has been of a more general sort, or of such a specific type that it does not
constitute the benefactor a Brunswikian in any exacting sense. But even
in these cases, the influence has sometimes been quite significant. Donald
Campbell may serve as a prime example. Although his work has followed
its own trajectory, he acknowledges that its distinctive thrust has come
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from the early inspiration he received as a student and assistant of Brunswik at Berkeley. This inspiration, Campbell has written, was focused "at
the levels of general perspective and of stating the problems which psychology must face." Furthermore, although Campbell has not been able
to follow Brunswik on many points that Brunswik regarded as important,
Brunswik's "stand" on such matters has served as "a major reference
point" in Campbell's clarification of his own, different position. Beyond
that, Campbell notes that his "total indebtedness to [Brunswik] is hard
to estimate, since I learned from him primarily through lectures and conversations." He illustrates this point by reviewing several "discoveries"
he made years after leaving Berkeley, only to find out later - when reviewing class notes from Brunswik's courses - that he had heard about these
discoveries long before he made them. 35 Many other Berkeley students
say the same thing. 36
The list of those who were inspired by Brunswik in general, but meaningful ways could be extended to include those whose relation to Brunswik was mediated through his publications rather than through personal
contact. Roger Barker and Jerome Bruner are only two of many wellknown psychologists who have acknowledged some sort of "distal" debt
to Brunswik - for general or partial inspiration rather than for his psychology as a whole. Similarly, references to Brunswik can be found scattered throughout the literature of recent decades on methodology, learning, thinking, decision processes, perception, communication, and
psychological ecology. In addition, probabilism and the basic metaphor
of the mind as an intuitive statistician have been gaining in popularity.
But in most of the cases where Brunswik's work is cited as a precedent,
it is generally a fairly routine citation, meant to confer a sense of authority and legitimacy to current theory and practice rather than to acknowledge an actual intellectual debt. As Herbert Simon has noted, Brunswik
was a forerunner of a number of developments, but "did not, in fact, have
much influence on what developed." 37
Influence is an elusive thing. Even to corroborate some new developments - to serve as a legitimizing reference - is not without its significance. But it is clearly not what .Brunswik had in mind. Given his generally acknowledged brilliance, why has so much of Brunswik's
"influence" been of this nebulous, unfocused sort? And why have so
many psychologists been uninfluenced by Brunswik, even in this rather
generously construed form?
Even if Brunswik was properly understood - and this was frequently
not the case - a number of reasons internal to his psychology help
account for his limited, ambiguous legacy. Perhaps the major reason is
that it is virtually impossible to implement Brunswik's. methodology
without some qualification. Even Brunswik never attempted, much less
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accomplished, a completely Brunswikian study. His groundbreaking
1944 monograph on "Distal Focussing of Perception" was only "a methodological demonstration" of his approach, not a fully realized study
based on representative design. As Brunswik himself admitted, he had
not scrutinized the situational generality of this study's results, nor had
he checked the representativeness of the subject's choices of objects to be
perceived. 38
Demonstration or not, however, this study took a great deal of effort
beyond that demanded by a typical laboratory experiment, and so it did
not help his case - at least for those who were reading closely - when
Brunswik noted that "the general trend and proportion of results" in
more traditional experiments "is quite similar to those of the present
study." As a result, he conceded, "the major results of our study may
seem commonplace. A checkup of this kind is, however, a methodological requirement." 39 If in fact Brunswik's admittedly more cumbersome
approach confirmed the general results of much simpler laboratory experiments, it was certainly not clear that the extra effort was necessary,
except perhaps as an occasional "checkup" on the validity of experimental methodology.
The other major study that might seem to qualify as a definitive application of Brunswik's methodology is the second part of Perception and
the Representative Design of Psychological Experiments, entitled "Perception: The Ecological Generality of its Distal Aim." This was Brunswik's final, summary treatment of his research on the psychology of perception. But in the Preface to this work, written just five months before
his death, Brunswik admitted that it had become increasingly clear to
him that "hybrid designs combining features of both systematic and representative deisgn are likely to contiriue and even to increase in frequency
within the near future"; and in fact his own research in this study
reflected this move toward "such an intermediate area." 40
Beyond the practical difficulties that led to this sort of methodological
compromise were emotional and intellectual difficulties that had to be
faced. It may seem odd to speak of emotional difficulties when considering the application of scientific method, but in this case, as in others,
emotional factors seem to have played a very tangible role. In the 1940s
and early 1950s the nomothetic ideal of discovering universal and absolute natural laws through the use of carefully controlled experiments was
deeply ingrained in the cultural ethos of the scientific community. Perhaps nothing, other than complete intellectual and methodological anarchy, could have been so threatening to that community - and especially
to the self-conscious subculture of scientific psychology - as Brunswik's
espousal of a thoroughgoing probabilism combined with his radical critique of experimentalism. How difficult it could be to deal with Brun-
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swik's probabilistic functionalism is poignantly conveyed by Brunswik's
own confession:
The present writer has in himself experienced the required shift of
emphasis as very slow going and hard to maintain, especially so far
as consistent concrete application is concerned. The difficulties he
encountered . . . have given him the impression of resistances
approaching in intensity those encountered in the opening up of
emotionally highly loaded topics, such as those dealt with in
psychoanalysis. 41
And so:
It takes a certain courage, a neglect of some of the attitudes sacred

to scientific tradition, to give up the safety of molecular correlations,
cheap as they are, in favor of the equivocalities or "vaguenesses" of
molar correlations. But we have to prefer vagueness focused upon
essentials to security and strict univocality focussed upon nonessentials.42
Brunswik was not exaggerating his own personal difficulty. For someone as rationalistic as he was, it had taken an enormous amount of courage to follow the path he felt compelled to take. He did not want probabilistic "explanations" of psychological phenomena; rather, psychological
phenomena - it seemed to him - demanded such treatment, in total disregard of his temperamental inclinations. 43 But, as we have seen, Brunswik's realization of this need for a thoroughgoing probabilistic functionalism took many years to develop and grew out of a unique interplay of
intellectual and scientific traditions. Perhaps he should not have expected
others, who had the benefit of neither the same amount of time nor the
same intellectual context, to respond in the affirmative when he called for
fundamental change in psychology. In addition to all else, he was making
this call during one of the most self-assured and dogmatic periods in psychology's history. It was hardly a time when the dice were loaded in his
favor.
Such factors account for some of the obstacles that Brunswik's psychology faced: His methods were "formidable"; his theory was "at variance with the more traditional notions"; and his probabilism was bound
to elicit some "emotional resistance." 44 We might be satisfied with them
as an explanation for Brunswik's clouded legacy except that so many psychologists seemed not to understand his methodological, theoretical, and
probabilistic convictions. They did not reject Brunswik's psychology for
emotional or even clearly defined intellectual reasons. They simply let it
slip by, in ignorance of its meaning and import. These psychologists
include not only those who lived beyond Brunswik's orbit, but also many
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of his own students and colleagues. Here is the rub: Why have so many
people simply not understood what Brunswik was saying? Why did Donald Campbell have to write in 1954 that "too few of us Berkeley students
got what [Brunswik] had to say," even after attending his lectures and
working with him as teaching and research assistants? 45 It is hardly surprising that others have failed to understand Brunswik's message if his
own students and colleagues have admitted a considerable degree of
incomprehension.
Derivation, Migration, Dissemination: Situating Brunswik in
the History of Psychology
Three interrelated factors have contributed significantly to the misunderstanding and incomprehension from which Brunswik's psychology has
suffered. These factors are, first, the constitution of Brunswik's psychology; second, the effects of Brunswik's move to the United States; and,
third, the ways in which Brunswik tried to communicate his psychology.
Brunswik's psychology, as we have seen, was derived from a unique
blend of intellectual and scientific traditions. The functionalist premises
that Brunswik received from the European act-psychology tradition and
the probabilist assumptions that he derived from a branch of the logical
positivist movement were far from familiar to the majority of American
psychologists. In addition, Brunswik's application of the statistical tools
of differential psychology to the traditional subject matter of experimental psychology clashed with the mindset of American psychologists who
had come to think of differential and experimental psychology as two
quite distinct "disciplines" within psychology. 46
The upshot, in colloquial terms, was that most American psychologists
had difficulty understanding where Brunswik was coming from. At the
same time most European psychologists, until the Anglo-American statistical tradition made greater inroads on the Continent in the 1960s and
1970s, had trouble comprehending, and so were not persuaded by, Brunswik's mature system of probabilistic functionalism.
In referring to the American and European situations I have already
trespassed on my second point, that Brunswik's migration from Vienna
to Berkeley affected more than the final theoretical articulation of his psychology. In making the move to the United States, Brunswik lost an audience that shared much of his intellectual background, the aid ofa number
of talented and committed research assistants, and a professional context
in which perception was seen as an important and attractive research
problem. In the United States during the 1940s and early 1950s, perception was not a highly regarded research topic and did not attract the number of able young investigators that it had in Vienna. As a result, despite
the general influence he had on many students, Brunswik never played
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the active role in directing student research that he had enjoyed previously in Vienna. In all his years at Berkeley, he directed only four doctoral dissertations. Even Kenneth Hammond, his one true "disciple" at
Berkeley, did not do his major research under Brunswik's direction. This
loss of an institutional basis for a large-scale research program made it
difficult for Brunswik to implement his theoretical insights as quickly and
completely as he would have liked. As a result, he left behind much less
research and fewer disciples than he might have in a more supportive
context. 47
The third factor I want to consider is Brunswik's style of communication - the means by which he sought to disseminate his ideas. I have not
yet emphasized the number of important theoretical papers that Brunswik presented at philosophical conferences and published in philosophical journals. Never cutting his tie to the logical positivist and subsequent
Unity of Science movements, Brunswik continued to scrutinize his psychological theory and methods - and to invite scrutiny - from the point
of view of philosophical analysis. Although some American psychologists, such as Tolman and Hull, had peripheral associations with these
movements, the majority of American psychologists were insulated from
them and were therefore insulated from a certain number of Brunswik's
important theoretical presentations. 48
In addition, as mentioned previously in the brief discussion of his Conceptual Framework of Psychology, Brunswik was a careful student of the
history of psychology, and he used his distinctive historical analyses to
provide a context for explaining and defending his own probabilistic
functionalism. Although his publications in this area were few in number,
Brunswik frequently utilized historical analysis in his teaching, and his
history of psychology course was one of the major means of communicating his approach to many Berkeley students. Unfortunately, there is
evidence that these students were unprepared to profit from these analyses and hence missed the opportunity to learn what Brunswik was trying
to convey. 49
Matters were not helped by the fact that Brunswik was such a widely
read scholar who continually referred to new developments in other sciences and disciplines that might have some significance for psychology.
Many students heard for the first time about cybernetics, communications theory, econometrics, open system thermodynamics, biological systems theory, time series analysis and other developments in Brunswik's
courses. His enthusiastic discussions of how these developments might
be of service to psychologists were not always matched by the students'
ability to follow what he was talking about.5°
If the channels of communication that Brunswik used and the content
of what he had to say often extended beyond the ken of his students and
of most psychologists, Brunswik's writing style did little to balance the
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situation. In lectures and in personal conversation he was more expansive, which was often a problem in its own right, especially when his listeners were unable to follow the connections he would make. But in his
writings, Brunswik's style was brutally precise, succinct, and demanding.
As Tolman put it, Brunswik "was never willing to oversimplify or restrict
the actual complexities of the relationships with which he was concerned.
This always makes the reading of whatever he wrote a difficult task but
an exciting and stimulating challenge [at least for the sympathetic
Tolman]." 51
Perhaps the scale of difficulty is best conveyed by the "good news" and
"bad news" comments made by Julian Hochberg and Gustav Bergmann
on Brunswik's Conceptual Framework of Psychology. Hochberg noted
that a "decrease in Brunswik's customary condensation [in this book]
makes for an increase in ease of reading." True, but the increase in ease
was relative to Brunswik's own austere standard, as indicated by Bergmann's assessment that "physically this is a slim volume, hardly a book,
rather, a monograph of barely a hundred pages. Intellectually this is the
equivalent of three books or, to put it conservatively, of one well-sized
book and two monographs of about one hundred pages each." 52
There is no question that the style of Brunswik's communication - his
uncompromising efforts to say things just right and just once - had a deleterious effect on the understanding of his message. 53 Few readers were
able to muster the time and effort to enjoy the "exciting and stimulating
challenge" that Tolman promised. Those few who did - for instance,
Robert Leeper - were likely to ftnd Brunswik's work "more impressive
and persuasive" with prolonged study. But as Leeper himself noted, "in
an age like ours, where rapid reading is praised, his [work] is altogether
unsuited to the mode of approach that most readers would tend to
bring. " 54 In other words, it was not likely that many readers would choose
to slowly and laboriously decode Brunswik's full message, and they have
not. Instead many have turned to Brunswik's work for brief periods of
time and have taken away this or that piece of his message, either ignorant or uncaring about the larger, systematic context from which that
piece was removed.
Where does that leave us - or rather, where does it leave Brunswik? It
is too soon to say what place he may be assigned in the larger sweep of
the history of psychology, but in his own period of time, as I have tried
to show, he was clearly situated at a number of crossroads - between various intellectual and scientific traditions (European functionalism, logical
positivism, American behaviorism, and Anglo-American statisticalism),
between various cultures and national traditions (European and American) and between various modes of scholarly endeavor (philosophical,
historical and scientific).
Perhaps because he was situated at so many crossroads, Brunswik was
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more sensitive than most psychologists to the directions in which psychology was going. It may seem odd to suggest that Brunswik, the proponent of such a distinctive system, was representative of mid-twentiethcentury psychology, but it is nevertheless the case that his system represented many of the major trends that have emerged more clearly into
view in the years since Brunswik's death. Brunswik foresaw and advocated the emergence of probabilism, psychological ecology, perception,
and cognition as key areas of psychological interest, increased scrutiny of
the validity and reliability of psychological knowledge, greater historical
and philosophical awareness, and the recognition of the "inextricable
entanglement" of theory and method.ss Brunswik was more than a weathervane, but he was that par excellence. If he did not create the weather
patterns, he had an uncanny sense of which way the fresh breezes were
blowing. Against the gales of opinion, he sought to give the breezes their
due attention.
Edwin G. Boring, as the editor of Contemporary Psychology, appended
the following quotation from John Morley to a 1957 review ofBrunswik's
posthumous Perception and the Representative Design of Psychological
Experiments:
There are some books which cannot be adequately reviewed for
twenty or thirty years after they come out.s 6
In this instance at least, I believe that Boring was more prophetic than
Tolman, whom I quoted at the beginning of this chapter. Thirty years
after Brunswik's death, the time does seem ripe for more adequate
reviews of Brunswik's life and works. I hope that this chapter will serve
as a helpful starting point.
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